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INTRODUCTION
What sets the wheels of innovation in motion? And, what keeps them running? With a focus on the impact of the owners of publicly listed companies on innovation, Aghion et al. (2013) attract attention to institutional ownership, that comprises '. . . all investors in financial markets which are neither private households nor public institutions' (Menkho↵, 2002, p. 907) . Aghion et al. (2013) show empirically that institutional ownership is positively correlated with innovation. Additionally, the authors aim to disentangle the link between innovation, institutional ownership, and product market competition. This is achieved by an empirical discrimination between a lazy manager and a career concerns hypothesis. As the dependent variable innovation is mapped out through the use of future citation-weighted patent counts, the methodological approach employed by Aghion et al. (2013) is based on count data models. The authors estimate a Poisson model for the mean equation and employ standard errors clustered at either the firm level or a three-digit industry level.
Replication in a narrow sense confirms the empirical results obtained by Aghion et al. (2013) . The software in use for the replication as well as for an extended analysis is R (R Core Team, 2013), instead of Stata, which is used by Aghion et al. (2013) . Apart from small deviations, our replication attempt was successful. Nevertheless, we argue that the relevance of factors that contribute to the occurrence of innovative outcome di↵ers between two distinct processes. Two aspects are of main interest in this context. The determinants that are necessary for a firm to be able to innovate, as well as the factors that keep an already innovating firm carrying out further innovations. Thus, we go one step furher and extend the analysis of Aghion et al. (2013) with hurdle models, which are useful to shed some light on potentially existing structural di↵erences. Hurdle models are two-part models with a binary part that models the decision to innovate at all, and a count part that models ongoing innovation, respectively. This approach can be subsumed 1 2 S. BERGER, H. STOCKER, AND A. ZEILEIS as a 'replication in a wider sense', and reveals that on the one hand, there is a stable positive correlation of innovation with institutional ownership, but on the other hand, the results are inconclusive regarding the career concerns and the lazy manager hypothesis. Indeed, there is some indication for a departure from the single-equation Poisson model, both from a statistical as well as from an economical perspective, as the Poisson model implicitly assumes one underlying process, for which the factors that drive innovation are the same. However, it might be the case that the first innovation is more di cult to achieve, especially compared to succeeding innovations. Thus, our contribution is the use of a more flexible modeling approach achieved through the utilization of count data hurdle models, instead of Poisson models. We argue that two-part hurdle models are, from a statistical as well as from an economical perspective, an interesting alternative that can provide us with new insights into the determinants that trigger innovative outcome.
In line with Aghion et al. (2013) , most studies in the empirical literature that consider the relationship between (institutional) ownership structure and innovation (or R&D spendings) find a positive correlation 1 . To name a few examples, Baysinger et al. (1991) find a positive e↵ect of institutional investors on R&D spendings (see also Hansen and Hill, 1991) . Kochhar and David (1996) state that institutions are long-term oriented, and thus have a positive influence on firm innovation. Bushee (1998) finds that high institutional ownership is accompanied by a reluctance from managers to cut R&D after a decline in earnings. David et al. (2001) state that it is rather institutional investor activism that has a positive influence on R&D input. Summing up, a variety of components appear in the recent literature that can explain a positive e↵ect of institutional investors on innovation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 comprises the replication of the basic results obtained by Aghion et al. (2013) as well as an extension of their analysis by means of hurdle models, Section 3 contains the replication and extension of models with competition included as a further explanatory variable. Section 4 concludes.
BASIC MODELS: REPLICATION AND EXTENDED ANALYSIS
Future citation-weighted patent counts are used as a proxy for the dependent variable innovation, which motivates the use of count data models. As a starting point (and following Aghion et al., 2013) , a log-link is implemented. In the spirit of a quasi-maximum likelihood approach, the Poisson model is employed for the mean equation along with clustered standard errors. The conditional expectation function is
where Cites it is the number of citation-weighted patent counts for company i in year t, the vector x it contains all explanatory variables for firm i in year t in the model, i are firm-specific fixed e↵ects controls and t are time dummy variables (Aghion et al., 2013, pp. 280-281) . All models include institutional ownership, which is measured as the percentage of outstanding shares held by institutions, the capital to labor ratio as well as sales (in logs), time dummies and four-digit industry dummies as explanatory variables (Aghion et al., 2013) . Some models additionally include the stock of R&D expenditures (in logs) and the presample mean-scaling estimator 2 developed by Blundell and Powell (2004) . Table I comprises the (successful) replication of Table 1 in Aghion et al. (2013, p. 283) , with minor di↵erences in the clustered standard errors. The outcomes show that the coe cient of institutional ownership is consistently positive and significant. However, the data show overdispersion as well as excess zeros. There are about 35.2% (accounting for 2,183 out of 6,208) firm-year observations with zero citation-weighted patents in the data. On one hand, the zeros can come from either the decision to keep potentially patentable discoveries in secrecy, or from the lack of This table is a replication of Table 1 in Aghion et al. (2013) . Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at firm level. There are 803 di↵erent firms. Additionally, all regressions include time dummies for each year (with reference category 1991) as well as four-digit industry dummies. Fixed e↵ects controls are included using the presample mean scaling estimator developed by Blundell and Powell (2004) . Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 any patentable finding (see Crepon and Duguet, 1997) , both of which resulting in a lack of any patents. On the other hand, the zeros can come from holding patents, but without citations. In the data analyzed, there are about 32.6% firm-year observations with zero patents in the data and 2.6% with patents but without citations. Summarizing the above, the amount of zeros in the dependent variable is higher than expected by the Poisson distribution, which casts doubt on the distributional assumption and suggests potentially di↵erent determinants driving the zero and non-zero citations. Furthermore, overdispersion is a common characteristic of count data (in the field of economics), meaning that the conditional variance is higher than the conditional mean. The fraction
Mean(Cites) = 4, 836.2 reveals a substantial amount of overdispersion for citation-weighted patents (note that covariates are not taken into account here). A negative binomial model o↵ers some remedy in such a situation (see e.g. Hausman et al., 1984) . As a likelihood model, it does explicitly account for dispersion. Aghion et al. (2013) consider negative binomial models only in their basic models in Table 1 ( columns 6, 7, and 8) . However, it is worth pointing out that the negative binomial model does also not explain the high proportion of zero citations discussed above.
Finally, the Poisson model assumes independent occurrences over time (see e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) and it may also be the case that the first innovation (the first citation-weighted patent count) is especially hard to obtain in comparison to succeeding innovations, such that '. . . the innovation process is characterized by nonlinearities' (Crepon and Duguet, 1997, p. 360) . For example, in case of the discovery of a seminal innovation, some further discoveries of minor importance can follow more easily (Crepon and Duguet, 1997) .
In summary, these considerations concerning excess zeros, overdispersion, and potentially different determinants in the innovation process can be addressed by two-part hurdle models. Specifically, these consider the case that there are two di↵erent processes driving either the 'first innovation' (does a company own at least one citation-weighted patent) or the 'continuing innovation' (if a company has a positive number of citation weighted patents, how many of them does it possess) decision. Hurdle models allow to make this discrimination: Positive outcomes are observed if the zero hurdle is crossed and are modeled through a truncated (from the left) count model, whereas the probability to cross the hurdle is modeled via a censored binary model (see e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) . Table II shows the same models as Table I , but using negative binomial hurdle models instead of the (single-equation) Poisson models. As in the original analysis standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The results indicate that the coe cient of institutional ownership is for most of the estimated hurdle models positive and significant. The only exception is the count part of the Hurdle NegBin (3) model, where the coe cient of institutional ownership is no longer significant. Quantitatively, a dampening of the coe cient of institutional ownership in the count part of the model can be observed, the more variables are included into the model. In the binary part of the model, the Blundell and Powell (2004) . The zero part is a binomial with logit link. The count part is a truncated negative binomial. Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 coe cient of institutional ownership is quite stable. For most of the other explanatory variables, a dampening of the coe cients in both parts of the model can be observed the more variables are included into the model.
COMPETITION MODELS: CAREER CONCERNS VS. LAZY MANAGER
Two hypotheses are considered by Aghion et al. (2013) , the lazy manager hypothesis and the career concerns hypothesis (which is preferred by Aghion et al., 2013) . Both hypotheses predict a positive relationship between institutional ownership and innovation, but they di↵er with regard to product market competition.
The lazy manager approach is based on 'quiet life' models developed by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) . It is assumed that managers prefer a quiet life, and want to keep the status quo, as '. . . he [the average manager] seems to avoid creating new plants as much as he avoids destroying old ones' (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003, p. 1072) . If competition is high, there is no need for intensified monitoring, because 'competiton is a source of discipline.' (Hart, 1983, p. 366) . Hence, the lazy manager approach implies that institutions and competition are substitutes (Aghion et al., 2013, p. 292) .
The career concerns hypothesis pays closer attention to the managerial labor market. In a seminal paper, Fama (1980) investigates how pressure imposed by managerial labor markets can discipline managers. As a manager's talent is at least partially unknown to other market participants '. . . investment decisions become tests that provide information about talent. Perceptions about talent, in turn, determine the manager's future opportunity wage and this is what makes investments risky from the manager's perspective even if income is not explicitly tied to profits' (Holmstrom, 1999, p. 178) . Institutional investors insure the manager against career risks, as they collect independent information (the crucial point here is the assumption of better monitoring abilities by institutional investors) and assess the ability of a manager based on that information, and not solely based on revenue realization (Aghion et al., 2013) . Thus, if competition is high, the positive e↵ect of institutional investors on innovation should be stronger. According to the career concerns hypothesis, institutions and competition are complements (Aghion et al., 2013, p. 292) . Table III contains the replication of a selection of Poisson models 3 conducted by Aghion et al. (2013, p. 293) , with product market competition included as a further explanatory variable. Column 1 displays a Poisson model with an interaction between product market competiton and Table 2 in Aghion et al. (2013) . All models are Poisson regression models. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at three-digit industry level. There are 803 di↵erent firms. Additionally, all regressions include time dummies for each year (with reference category 1991) as well as four-digit industry dummies. Fixed e↵ects controls are included using the presample mean-scaling estimator developed by Blundell and Powell (2004) . An industry is classified as one with high competition if it is above the median of the 1 Lerner index. Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 institutional ownership. As the coe cient has a positive sign and is significant, this is indicative for the career concerns hypothesis and against the lazy manager hypothesis. Columns 2 and 3 of Table III show two Poisson models based on a high and low competition sample, respectively. The coe cient of institutional ownership is positive and significant for the model based on the high competition sample, whereas it is zero and insignificant for the low competition model. Again, this result delivers evidence for the career concerns hypothesis.
To show that the Poisson model with interaction term provides quantitatively nearly the same conclusions as the two Poisson models with the data split into high vs. low product market competition, we use the following illustration. As a rough guideline, assume a value of 0.9 for high competition, and a value of 0.8 for low competition 4 For high competition, the coe cient of institutional ownership (Table III , column 1) is 0.064 + 0.9 · 0.082 = 0.0098, whereas the coe cient has a value of 0.064 + 0.8 · 0.082 = 0.0016 for low competition. These coe cients are very close to those in the models based on the high-and low-competition sample in Table III, columns 2  and 3 , with values of 0.009 and 0.000. Thus, with regard to the interpretation of the institutional ownership coe cient, there is hardly any di↵erence between a modeling strategy based on an 'interaction view' and a 'sub-sample view'. Table IV contains the same models as Table III , but again hurdle models are employed, instead of Poisson models. If both zero and non-zero citations were driven by the same determinants, then both parts of the hurdle model should deliver similar results as the Poisson model. However, it is observed that the clear preference for the career concerns hypothesis and against the lazy manager hypothesis heavily depends on the model framework. When hurdle models are used, the empirical results do not show such a clear picture. Even more, there is some evidence that neither the lazy manager hypothesis nor the career concerns hypothesis can satisfactorily explain the mechanisms at work.
The coe cient of the interaction term of competition times the share of institutional owners (Hurdle NegBin (1)) is negative and significant (at the 5 percent significance level) in the zero part 44, 973.690 24, 328.266 20, 584.206 BIC 47, 040.904 25, 217.203 21, 712 .500 Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at three-digit industry level. There are 803 di↵erent firms. Additionally, all regressions include time dummies for each year (with reference category 1991) as well as four-digit industry dummies. Fixed e↵ects controls are included using the presample mean-scaling estimator developed by Blundell and Powell (2004) . The zero part is a binomial with logit link. The count part is a truncated negative binomial. An industry is classified as one with high competition if it is above the median of the 1 Lerner index. Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 of the model, whereas it is positive but not significant in the count part of the model. The fact that the interaction term in the zero part of the model has a negative sign is puzzling, as neither the lazy manager hypothesis nor the career concerns hypothesis can provide an adequate explanation for this result. The career concerns hypothesis requires that the coe cient of the interaction term is positive and signicant, because then the assumption that competition and innovation are complements is fulfilled. However, the influence of institutional ownership is di↵erent in the two parts of the model, which can also be observed in the models with the sample split into high and low competition. In the high competition sample, the coe cient of institutional ownership is positive in both parts of the model, but only in the count part significant (Hurdle NegBin (2)), whereas the coe cient is positive in both parts of the model for the low competition sample, too, but only significant in the zero part of the model (Hurdle NegBin (3)). Furthermore, a similar numerical illustration as shown above also applies to hurdle models 5 . One possible interpretation is that with a low level of (product market) competition in a market, the results indicate a positive influence of institutional investors on the decision to conduct the 'first innovation', but only a very small e↵ect on the decision to engage in 'continuing innovations'. With a high level of (product market) competition in a market, the e↵ect of institutional investors refers more to 'continuing innovation', rather than to 'first innovation'. Summing up, the influence of institutional ownership on innovation is in both parts of the models positive, but not in every part significant. This result can be seen as an image with a higher resolution than is possible to generate within the Poisson approach.
In a nutshell, the discrimination between the career concerns hypothesis on the one hand and the lazy manager hypothesis on the other hand based on Poisson models does not produce the same results as a modeling strategy based on a hurdle (or even a negative binomial) model.
As a consequence, this raises the issue whether the conclusions drawn in the Aghion et al. (2013) paper are robust. Of course, we most certainly can not stand here and say that the use of hurdle models is the most suitable solution. In the alternative, should it be held that the Poisson model would be the most appropriate model, the hurdle model should deliver similar results. The results which we have achieved do not point in that direction, though. Instead, we find that innovation is di↵erently a↵ected by institutional owners in the two parts of a hurdle model. Any conclusion that shows preference for the career concerns hypothesis and against the lazy manager hypothesis can not be drawn in such a setting.
CONCLUSION
Based on a successful replication in a narrow sense of (parts of) the Aghion et al. (2013) paper, a refinement of the modeling strategy reveals di↵erences with regard to the sign and significance of the coe cients of interest, and hence also to the interpretation. The results obtained from an extended analysis with negative binomial hurdle models di↵er materially from the outcomes of the single-equation Poisson approach carried out by Aghion et al. (2013) . While the Poissonbased model delivers a clear indication for the career concerns hypothesis and against the lazy manager hypothesis, there is evidence for a deviation from the Poisson model. Both economical as well as statistical considerations suggest that di↵erent determinants may drive zero and nonzero patent citations. If a single set of determinants were su cient for describing the underlying innovation processes, then both parts of the hurdle model should lead to estimates that are similar to the coe cients from the Poisson equation. However, both the sign and the significance of the coe cients of interest change when employing the hurdle model (using the same type of clustered standard errors as in the Poisson case), providing evidence for di↵ering determinants.
From an economic perspective, this is a di↵erence in determinants of 'first innovation' and 'continuing innovation', respectively. If it is the case that the first innovation (the first citationweighted patent count) is especially hard to obtain in comparison to succeeding innovations, hurdle models o↵er a useful way which allows for a distinction to be made between these two processes. The rationale behind this is the notion of nonlinearities in the innovation process (Crepon and Duguet, 1997, p. 360) . Then, the processses that drive innovative outcome might themselve be a↵ected by a number of di↵erent driving factors.
The empirical findings resulting from the extended analysis concerning the discrimination between the lazy manager hypothesis and the career concerns hypothesis indicate that neither hypothesis is completely satisfactory. The unambiguous, interpretable picture arising out of the analysis of Aghion et al. (2013) can not be fully confirmed when hurdle models are used. Nevertheless, there is some evidence for a remarkably stable positive correlation of citation-weighted patents and institutional ownership across specifications.
COMPUTATIONAL DETAILS
The results of the empirical analysis are obtained using R 3.1.0 (R Core Team, 2013) with the packages AER 1.2-1, countreg 0.1-1, foreign 0. 8-61, MASS 7.3-33 (Venables and Ripley, 2002) , pscl 1.04.4 (Zeileis et al., 2008) especially for the function hurdle(), and sandwich 2.3-0 (Zeileis, 2006) .
